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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LOST-VOLUME RETAIL SELLER
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG*
Suppose that a customer agrees to buy a boat and before it is deliv-
ered, he reneges. The dealer subsequently resells the boat to another
customer at the same price. Has the seller suffered damages (aside
from incidental damages)' and, if so, should he be compensated? This
question, dubbed the lost-volume seller problem, has been the subject
of considerable legal analysis, usually in the context of explicating sec-
tion 2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).2 There have
been a number of attempts to apply economic analysis to this difficult
question, the most recent by Professors Goetz and Scott.3 Unfortu-
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University, School of Law. B.A. 1963, Oberlin College;
M.A., Economics, 1964, Ph.D., Economics, 1970, Yale University. The author would like to thank
Jack Ayer, Alan Brownstein, and Ian Macneil for comments on an earlier draft.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code provides for recovery of incidental damages by the
seller in § 2-710.
2. The Code language is as follows:
§ 2-708. Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and place
for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages provided
in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's
breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of dam-
ages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made
from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in
this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit
for payments or proceeds of resale.
U.C.C. § 2-708 (1978).
The legal literature is summarized in Goetz & Scott, Measuring Seller's Damages: The Lost-
Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323, 323-33 (1979).
3. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2. For other discussions applying economic analysis to the
lost-volume seller, see Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2):
Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 681 (1972); Comment,
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nately, the economic analysis thus far employed has not helped. The
analysis has fundamentally misrepresented the problem. While the
Goetz-Scott policy conclusion is quite probably correct, the path to that
conclusion is not.
This Article presents an alternative analysis that better captures
the economics of the problem. This analysis concerns those issues that
logically precede questions of what the rule ought to be or how section
2-708(2) ought to be applied. The focus is on how the problem should
be analyzed rather than on what the correct rule ought to be. There
will be room for reasonable people to disagree on the rule's content and
on its application.
The central error of the Goetz-Scott analysis (and the others) is the
failure to recognize explicitly that the seller in our boat example is a
retailer.4 Once this point is recognized and models are chosen accord-
ingly, the analysis becomes quite simple. That analysis will be devel-
oped in Parts II and III. First, however, this Article presents a
simplified summary of the Goetz-Scott analysis.
I. THE GOETZ-SCOTT ANALYSIS
Professors Goetz and Scott build their analysis around the para-
digm case of Neri v. Retail Marine Corp. I They summarize the Neri
facts and decision concisely:
Retail Marine, a dealer in marine equipment and supplies, con-
tracted to sell a new boat to Neri for $12,500. Marine then ordered
and received the boat from its supplier. Six days after the agreement
Neri repudiated the contract. Four months later Marine sold the
boat to another buyer for the same price. When Neri sued to recover
his downpayment, Marine counterclaimed for lost profits of $2,500
under U.C.C. § 2-708(2), arguing that absent Neri's default it would
have earned two profits rather than one. The New York Court of
Appeals sustained Marine's lost-volume claim, holding that "the
conclusion is clear from the record-indeed with mathematical cer-
tainty-that [market damages are] inadequate to put the seller in as
good a position as performance. . . and hence. . . the seller is enti-
tled to its [profit]." The court categorized Retail Marine's situation as
A Theoretical Postscript: Microeconomics and the Lost- Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
712 (1973).
4. Section 2-708(2) does, however, apply to situations other than those involving retail
sales. See U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2 (1978) (recovery of lost profits permitted in all appropriate
cases). The Goetz-Scott analysis is not confined solely to the retailer situation.
5. 30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 285 N.E.2d 311 (1972).
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that of a dealer with an "inexhaustible" supply of boats; conse-
quently, the second buyer did not replace the first.6
Goetz and Scott begin their analysis of the effects of a breach by
assuming that the seller is in a competitive industry. In Figure 1 (a
simplified version of their Figure 17), prior to a breach the firm equates
price to marginal cost and produces quantity Q. What would the firm
do if Neri breached his agreement to purchase one unit? It would still
supply Q units, and because demand is perfectly elastic with respect to
price, it would still sell Q units. The "lost sale" is perfectly replaced.
So long as the firm has a unique optimal scale (P=MC) and the firm
has an inexhaustible pool of customers willing to pay the market price,
breach is irrelevant.
S/Unit
Q Quantity
FIGURE 1
Goetz and Scott acknowledge that "[t]he perfectly competitive
model is too simple for the real world. ' 8 They therefore shift their at-
tention to the case in which the seller has market power and isolate two
effects-the cost effect and the demand effect. Their argument is con-
fusing and unnecessarily complex.' The following summary is a greatly
simplified version which captures the essence of their analysis.
6. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 332 (footnote omitted).
7. Id at 334.
8. Id at 335.
9. Their model involves a seller selling in two distinct markets---contract and spot. Goetz
and Scott are not very clear as to what they mean by these terms. I presume that the former
involves goods ordered from the dealer to be delivered at a later date, at which time title changes
hands and the contract is consummated; the latter would involve goods sold off-the-lot or out of
inventory. A breach is possible only for the contract purchasers. A spot contract is executed so
quickly, presumably, that there is no time to breach. This distinction does not appear to be help-
ful. The discussion in the text makes all their points while avoiding some of the analytical compli-
cations arising from the spot/contract dichotomy.
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A. THE COST EFFECT
Suppose that Marine initially faces a downward sloping demand
curve. If a buyer (Neri) decides that he no longer wants the good and
breaches his contract, this can be treated as a leftward shift of the de-
mand curve and of the marginal revenue curve (from MR o to MR, in
Figure 2A).1° What happens to the equilibrium quantity? This de-
pends upon the shape of the marginal cost curve (see Figure 2B).
MCC2
S/Unit MC S/Unit
V MRI MR MR, R
Quantity Q1 Q2 Q3  Quantity
FIGURE 2A FIGURE 2B
If marginal costs were constant (MC 1), the quantity decreases by
(Q3-Q1); if vertical (MC3), the firm produces the same quantity as
before (Q,); and if it is in between (MC 2), the quantity change is be-
tween these two extremes (Q2-Q1). Goetz and Scott conclude the dis-
cussion of this "cost effect" by observing that the breached contract will
result in more lost sales volume the less steep the cost curve. I I
Oddly, Goetz and Scott do not consider the effect of the breach on
market price. The new equilibrium would entail a reduced market
price for all the firm's sales in this model; this should be considered a
cost of breach borne by the seller. Since Goetz and Scott do take a
similar price effect into account in their discussion of the demand ef-
fect, such treatment would seem to be dictated by symmetry
considerations.
B. THE DEMAND EFFECT
Instead of breaching, Neri could have accepted the boat, even
10. If the demand curve is linear, then the shift in the marginal revenue curve is half the shift
of the demand curve.
11. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 339.
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though he no longer wanted it, and then resold it. Goetz and Scott
compare the effects on the seller when the buyer breaches versus when
he accepts and then acts as a reseller. To isolate the demand effect,
they assume that marginal costs are constant. 12 They assume initially
that resale is costless.'3 Their paradoxical conclusion is that the seller
would be better off if the buyer breached rather than if the buyer ful-
filled the contract and then resold.' 4 Their argument is as follows.
MRQ :MR DQIP ------
AQ=.5B
FIGURE 3
In Figure 3 (which is their Figure 2B) 15 the market demand (D 2) is
drawn on the assumption that Neri has already contracted for the boat,
but no longer wants it. They then compare what would happen if Neri
were to breach and the boat were to remain under the control of
Marine with what would happen if Neri does not breach and takes
responsibility for disposing of the boat. The model is generalized to
cover the case in which the initial contract was for B units; in Neri, B
equals one. If Neri breaches, the profit-maximizing monopolist would
equate marginal revenue (MR 2) with marginal cost and sell Q2 units at
a price of P2. If Neri does not breach, then Marine would face a
"residual demand curve" (DI), derived by subtracting the units under
Ned's control that could be resold in the same market. Nonbreach
results in sales by Marine of Q, (in addition to the B units of the origi-
nal sale). Thus, if the contract is breached, the seller's volume is Q2; if
it is not breached, the seller's volume is QI + B = (Q2 - .5B) + B = Q2
+ .5B. With the special assumptions of constant marginal costs, linear
12. d at 341.
13. Id at 341 n.45.
14. See id at 347-48 (breach permits expansion in seller's market for additional sales by
removing risk that he "may lose one of [his] limited noncontractual buyers").
15. Id at 340.
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demand, and costless resale, breach results in a loss on one-half of the
breached quantity.
The key feature driving the result is the treatment of Marine as a
price leader and Neri as a price taker. When the seller owns the
boat(s), he acts like a monopolist. When Neri owns the boat(s), Marine
sets a monopoly price with regard to the residual demand curve, which
results in a different profit-maximizing quantity and price.
Unlike their discussion of the cost effect, Goetz and Scott's discus-
sion of the demand effect does recognize that there could be an effect
upon price. Breach results in revenues of P2Q2 and nonbreach of P,(Q2 - .5B) + PcB, where Pc is the initial contract price. If nonbreach
would have led to a reduction in the market price, then the breach re-
sults in a higher price for the units sold. Note that this formulation
presumes that the monopolist would allow a small fixed supply of the
good in the hands of another (Neri) to affect the overall price level. If
Marine really were concerned about this possibility, it could buy the
boat back from Neri or hire someone to do so.
Notwithstanding the dubious applicability of their particular argu-
ment, Goetz and Scott do raise a valid issue. The buyer could resell
rather than breach. Unfortunately, this insight has been obscured by
the choice of a modelling strategy that focuses on an arcane point. Sec-
tion II of this Article explores the resale argument from a different an-
gle. Marine's role as a retailer providing retailing services receives
some, but not much, notice. It is of much greater import in Section III.
II. THE RESALE MARKET
Suppose that once Neri has placed his order, he is legally bound to
take the boat for his own use or to arrange for its resale to another
buyer. In Calabresi-Melamed terminology, Neri's placement of the or-
der gives Marine an entitlement protected by a property rule.' 6 Con-
ceivably, Neri could sit outside Marine's showroom and try to convince
potential buyers to purchase his boat rather than the dealer's boat. Ob-
viously, this is costly to Neri, but it would be feasible. Alternatively,
Neri could pay a retailer to resell the boat for him. If Neri could
choose from a number of equally attractive dealers, he would pay a fair
16. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability.- One View
ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (an entitlement protected by a property rule
must be purchased from its owner in a voluntary transaction).
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market price for the reselling service. Whether that price is one per-
cent, ten percent, or twenty percent of retail price depends upon the
anticipated costs of retailing. Thus, even if Neri has access to a com-
petitive market of resellers, he could find disposing of the boat a very
expensive proposition. Neri's situation is complicated if the initial
seller-Marine-is better situated than others to resell the boat. This
would be so, for example, if Neri's purchase and resale converts the
boat from a new to a used one and results in instant depreciation of,
say, twenty percent.
Initially, when buying his boat, Neri has a choice from a number
of boat retailers, some of whom carry brands that he prefers. After he
has placed the order with one, however, that dealer has an advantage
that it could exploit in bargaining to determine the price of reselling.
The legal damage rule-if unmodified by the initial contract-serves as
a backdrop for bargaining to determine the price of the reselling serv-
ices. That price would depend upon such considerations as Neri's vul--
nerability to Marine's opportunism (the costs of the next best
alternative), Marine's interest in maintaining customer good will, the
costs of using the legal system (the status quo determines whether one
party must invoke the costly legal system), the existence and amount of
any down payment, and the like.
Alternatively, Marine's entitlement could be protected only by a
liability rule (damages rather than specific performance). 7 This is the
more customary rule for breach of contract. What are Marine's dam-
ages? A reasonable approximation would be the competitive price for
the service of renegotiating the sale of a new boat. This damage rule
would not permit the retailer to take advantage of his unique ex post
situation in the post-breach bargaining. The competitive price of the
reselling service is, roughly, the gross margin (retail minus wholesale
price) of the dealer.'" This measure of damages is precisely what the
17. See id (an individual may destroy an entitlement protected by a liability rule if he is
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it).
18. A similar damage rule is often used by private parties enforcing selective distribution
systems. If one retailer "steals" a customer from another, the manufacturer will sometimes re-
quire the offending retailer to compensate the loser, with the compensation being roughly equal to
the gross margin. Magnavox, for example, utilized this tactic in enforcing its resale price mainte-
nance policy. Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance and the FTC: The Magnavox Investigation, 23
WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 481 (1982) (former Magnavox dealer had to pay difference between
wholesale and retail value to dealer who lost sale).
There is a parallel with the treatment of deficiency claims of secured creditors. The secured
creditor must set off the resale price against the prospective recovery. U.C.C. § 9-504(1). Al-
though there is no allowance for lost profits, the courts frequently accept a resale in the wholesale
market and allow the creditor to recover as his damages the wholesale-retail spread. For example,
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drafters of the U.C.C. had in mind under section 2-708(2):
The provision of this section permitting recovery of expected profit
including reasonable overhead where the standard measure of dam-
ages if inadequate. . . [is] designed to eliminate the unfair and eco-
nomically wasteful results arising under the older law when fixed
price articles were involved. This section permits the recovery of lost
profits in all appropriate cases, which would include all standard
priced goods. The normal measure there would be list price less cost
to the dealer or list price less manufacturing cost to the
manufacturer. 19
It would appear then that the arguments of the proponents of the
lost profit notion are vindicated. This conclusion, however, would be
premature. The following section considers other aspects of the eco-
nomics of retailing and relates them to the damages problem.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF RETAILING AND LOST PROFITS
Why would a manufacturer choose not to sell directly to consum-
ers? The simple answer is that it would cost too much. Retailers pro-
vide services to manufacturers and customers, reducing the costs of
distributing the goods. The retailer's revenue minus the costs of goods
sold will compensate for the costs of retailing, including a normal rate
of return on the retailer's investment. While it would be possible for a
retailer to sell retailing services separately (for example, by charging an
admission fee or by selling a catalogue), the typical retailer's compensa-
tion is directly tied to the sale of its output. The gross margin is set
high enough so that the costs will be covered by sales revenue. Thus,
regardless of which customers use the retail services, the retailer's com-
Shuchman found that in his sample of cars repossessed by the General Motors Acceptance Corpo-
ration, "[a]ll or nearly all the resales in [the sample] were at wholesale, to others in the business of
buying and selling used cars, and not to retail buyers in the usual retail market for used cars."
Shuchman, Condition and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 30
(1979). See also Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and
Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 30 (1969) (in studied cases, secured party sold car back to original
dealer or another used-car dealer at or below the wholesale price). White and Summers note that
the law is vague on this point: "With a few exceptions, the opinions discussing 9-504(3) do not
provide much guidance for determining whether the resale price should be measured against the
wholesale or retail market." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1117 (2d
ed. 1980) (footnote omitted). They note the similarity between this question and the lost profit
question and put forth the standard rationale for recovery of lost profits: "Even one who normally
sells at retail could argue that one of the costs of selling repossessed autos on his lot is the profit he
loses because he has so lost the opportunity to sell another car to the customer who bought the
repossessed one." Id at 1118 (footnote omitted).
19. U.C.C. § 2-708 comment 2 (1978).
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pensation comes solely from the buyers of his goods. If Mr. Jones
buys, he pays for the product and for a share of the retailing services; if
Mr. Smith does not buy, he pays nothing for the retailing services, re-
gardless of how much selling effort was exerted on his behalf. If Mr.
Neri orders a boat and then reneges, should he bear any of the costs of
retailing in the absence of specific contract language on this point? If
we hold him liable for lost profits, then the answer is yes.
A. THE PRICE OF OPTIONS
When Ned orders the boat, he can be viewed as purchasing an
option.2" If the boat is delivered, he pays the contract price which, of
course, includes a share of the overall costs of retailing. If between the
contract date and the delivery date Ned changes his mind, the option is
cancelled (te., the contract is breached). Ned would then pay the price
of the option (te., contract damages). What would be a reasonable
measure of the value of the option? The retailer's gross margin is one
possibility. If one has doubts that reasonable customers know or ought
to know the extent of their commitment when making an option con-
tract, then one should be uncomfortable about assessing the customer
for lost profit damages. Most buyers of boats and cars probably would
be shocked to learn that the price of their option exceeds fifteen percent
of the retail price.2t Fortunately, there exists a relatively simple device
to determine an accurate measure of the value of the option-a
nonrefundable deposit. The law should encourage the parties to use
this device, by denying recovery for lost profits in the absence of ex-
plicit contract language to the contrary.
This policy conclusion is not inevitable. Reasonable people might
agree with the analytical approach, yet conclude that a different policy
is in order. The remainder of this section develops the argument in
more detail. As a byproduct, the argument uncovers a significant con-
ceptual error in the Goetz-Scott analysis that has thus far been ignored.
20. This conceptualization is like that of Justice Holmes: "The only universal consequence
of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
event does not come to pass." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881).
21. Retail margins vary considerably across goods. In Neri, the retail markup was approxi-
mately 27%. See Record on Appeal at 19-21, Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285
N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972) (total cost to Retail Marine was $9409; profit was to be
$2579). Markups on Magnavox phonographs in the 1960's ranged from 20% to 48%. See
Goldberg, supra note 18, at 455, n.61 (in 1967 markup ranged from 20% to 43%; in 1968 eight
radio-phonographs had margin of 48%). According to Lawrence White, the list price on subcom-
pact cars exceeded the wholesale price by 17% and on full sized cars by 25%. L. WHITE, THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945 106 (1971).
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B. A FISH STORY
A retailer can influence his sales volume by his price or his selling
effort. To simplify the discussion, assume that price is fixed. 2 Selling
effort includes a broad mix of activities: advertising, maintaining high
ratios of inventory or salespeople to sales, locating in places that gener-
ate a high volume of foot traffic, maintaining elegant facilities, provid-
ing high quality service departments, developing high levels of
consumer good will, and so forth. Diminishing returns to selling effort
reflect the increased difficulty of reaching additional customers. For
example, an advertisement targeted to an audience within a one mile
radius of a boat dealership is likely to result in a larger percentage of
recipients responding to the ad than would one aimed at customers
within a 100 mile radius. With the retail and wholesale prices fixed, the
profit-maximizing firm sets marginal selling costs equal to the gross
nfiargin (Figure 4).
MC
S/Unit
$ 
n 
reta 
il
price
gross
margin
wholesale
price
Q Quantity
FIGURE 4
Suppose that one customer, Neri, breaches. What are the effects
on the dealer's sales and costs? The seller, Marine, loses the sale and
his costs are reduced roughly by the wholesale price of the boat-his
loss from the breach is approximately the gross margin. Goetz and
Scott, however, would argue either that another sale would replace the
Neri sale, or that Marine's cost saving would be the marginal cost,
22. The Code commentators explicitly consider the "fixed price good" in their discussion of
§ 2-708(2). See U.C.C. § 2-708(2) comment 2 (1978) (the provision is "designed to eliminate the
unfair and . . . wasteful results arising under the older law when fixed price articles were
involved").
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which is equal to the retail price.23 Hence, there would be no lost
profit. The difference lies in the interpretations of the marginal cost
concept. Marginal cost should not relate to actual output, ex post, as
Goetz and Scott's analysis implies; rather, it concerns planned output,
ex ante.
An analogy is helpful. Think of the customers as fish and the re-
tailer as a fisherman. The fisherman makes decisions on boat size,
crew, equipment, et cetera, on the basis of the relationship between
these inputs and expected catch. For a given combination of inputs (a
given level of fishing-or retailing-expense) on a normal day the
fisherman might anticipate a catch of, say, 1000 pounds. On a good
day he might land 2000 pounds and on a bad day he might do no more
than drown a lot of worms. The fisherman's optimal level and mix of
expenditures depends upon the distribution of expected outcomes and
their relationship to the input mix. There is no unique marginal cost
concept in this formulation. But if we had to have a single, summary
marginal cost measure, it would almost surely be the cost of increasing
the expected catch by one pound. Thus, if on a particular day, a fish is
hooked and then is lost, the fisherman loses the revenue from that fish
and avoids virtually no costs-the ex post marginal costs are roughly
zero. The fish that got away, like Neri, constitutes a net loss of revenue
for the business. So long as the probability of a fish getting away is not
positively correlated with the probability of hooking the next fish, the
lost fish constitutes a net loss to the fisherman. Likewise, so long as the
customer's reneging does not increase the likelihood of making the next
sale, the breach results in a net loss of revenue to the business.24
This analogy captures the notion that the lost profits proponents
were trying to convey-the typical retailer can expand sales in the short
run with little cost beyond the wholesale price in the sense that, if he
has a lucky month, then he could fill the additional orders. Commen-
tators, however, have used awkward terminology, such as an ability to
"supply all probable customers"25 and the "seller has an unlimited sup-
ply of goods,"26 to describe this concept.
23. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 333-35 (in the event of breach, seller will sell same
number of units, or breach will save seller costs it would have incurred on performance).
24. If the probabilities are negatively correlated, then the problem is exacerbated. This is, in
fact, likely. Deteriorating economic conditions would result in an increased probability of buyer
breach and would also result in lower demand; finding a new customer would be harder.
25. 5 A. CORBIN, CORIN ON CONTRACTS § 1100, at 541 (1964).
26. W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 183 (3d ed. 1976).
1984]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:283
C. WHO SHOULD BEAR THE Loss?
By now the reader should be convinced that the breach does im-
pose a loss upon the retailer and that the gross margin is an approxima-
tion of the magnitude of that loss. That does not mean, however, that
the breacher should be held liable. In the absence of a nonrefundable
deposit or explicit contract language to the contrary, the retailer ought
to bear the loss.
Suppose initially that the customer's decision to breach was a ran-
dom event.
S/Unit 2 S/Unit
MC
MCI
retail
P2 Dprice
\D 2  D,
Q Quantity Q Quantity
FIGURE 5A FIGURE 51)
In Figure 5A, the industry supply and demand curves (S, and D,) are
drawn on the assumption that the customer pays no damages if he
breaches. The supply curve reflects the sellers' costs of doing business,
including the expected costs of buyers breaching. Compare the equilib-
rium price/quantity combination with what would happen if customers
were liable for damages arising from the breach. Under the new liabil-
ity rule, represented by D2 and S2, the supply curve shifts to the right
since the firm no longer bears the expected costs of breach. On the
other hand, since the buyers now bear the costs, they are willing to pay
less for the good; the demand curve shifts to the left. If the expected
level of breach is independent of the legal regime, if attitudes toward
the risk of breach are the same for buyers and sellers, and if the per-
ceived likelihood of breach is the same on both sides of the market,
then the demand shift would completely offset the shift in the supply
curve. The quantity would be the same in both regimes and the price
difference (PI - P2) would be exactly equal to the expected unit cost of
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breach. The rule does not matter. This might appear surprising at first
glance, but, in fact, it is nothing more than Demsetz' variation on the
Coase Theorem.27
Now, consider the hypothetical with the retail price constant (Fig-
ure 5B). (In Figure 5A the price is allowed to adjust, while in Figure
5B the retail price is held constant; the basic analytical result remains
unchanged.) The typical firm's marginal costs are shown by MC,
drawn under the assumption that the firm bears the costs of breach.
Shifting liability to the customers has two effects. First, it lowers the
firm's costs in the same manner as in Figure 5A, to MC'. Second, since
the customers now value the good less than before, the firm will have to
work harder to persuade customers to buy the good at the constant
price; this results in a shift in the marginal cost curve in the opposite
direction back to MC.
The idealized conditions posited above do not hold. Information
about the probability of breach is not the same for buyers and sellers at
the formation stage of the contract. The individual customer has more
knowledge about his own tendencies to adhere to contracts, and some
scholars are inclined to emphasize this information asymmetry.28 I,
however, would be inclined to put more weight on the dealer's superior
ability, gathered from his business experience, to assess the probability
that an individual customer will back out of a deal.29 Dealers are in a
better position to know the magnitude of damages in the event of a
27. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960) (value of produc-
tion maximized regardless of legal position if pricing system is assumed to work without cost);
Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 225-26 (1972)
(analyzing the problem of liability for on-the-job accidents, concluding that the distribution of
wealth between workers and shareholders is unaffected by legal position).
The transaction can be viewed as having two parts--the sale of the good and insurance
against breach. Under the assumptions, the consumer pays for the insurance either directly or,
indirectly in the product price. Analytically, the problem is identical to the question of who bears
a sales tax or social security tax. In both instances, the formal assignment of the tax liability is
irrelevant.
28. When individuals know more of the relevant facts about themselves than the parties with
whom they are dealing, there is a problem of "adverse selection." If an insurance company sells a
life insurance policy available to anyone at a fixed price, those people who knew that they were
less healthy than the average person would be more likely to buy the insurance. See Akerlof, The
Marketfor "Lemons'" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. OF ECON. 488,
492-94 (1970) (as price level rises, those who insure themselves are those increasingly certain that
they will need the insurance).
29. In Neri, the buyer had no intention of backing out at the time of contracting; after sign-
ing the contract he learned that he required hospitalization and surgery. 30 N.Y.2d 393, 396, 334
N.Y.S.2d 165, 167, 285 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1972).
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breach, as noted in the discussion of options." Dealers also would
appear to be in a better position to spread the risk of a breach over
similar transactions than would a customer. Moreover, both Figures
5A and 5B are drawn on the assumption that enforcement of the law is
equally costly regardless of which way the right is assigned, which is
not the case.3'
A nonrefundable deposit has considerable attraction. First, it is
cheap to arrange, given that the parties are already entering into a con-
tract. Second, it provides evidence that the customer has been apprised
of the extent of his liability in the event that he fails to take delivery.32
Third, it forces the customer to value explicitly the option he purchases.
Conversely, it induces the seller to state ex ante the price he is willing to
put on that option.3 Finally, a policy of finding no damages in the
absence of a nonrefundable deposit has low enforcement costs. Other
things equal, a policy of leaving the losses where they lie is very
.attractive. 4
A nonrefundable deposit is, in effect, a prepaid penalty. It would
not be fruitful to explore here the courts' historic distaste for contrac-
tual penalties.35 It is sufficient to note that a proper resolution of the
legal issues involving the lost profit puzzle will inevitably involve some
of the same questions raised in the debates about the enforceability of
30. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
31. If there were no deposit and the seller had the legal right to recover lost profits, the seller
would have to use the legal system (or at least threaten to do so) to vindicate his right. If the law
did not grant lost profits, 'the breaching buyer would not have to use the legal process. The exist-
ence of a deposit would change the relative costs of protecting the parties' rights. The general
point is that the costs to the parties would not be the same, nor would they be invariant to the legal
regime.
32. In Neri, it appears that the buyer was not aware that the deposit was meant to be
nonrefundable; indeed, the court ruled that it was refundable. See infra text accompanying notes
37-39.
33. Some retailers have adopted extremely liberal policies on customer returns; a no-ques-
tions-asked returns policy is even more liberal than a policy of not recognizing lost profits dam-
ages, and goes well beyond what the law requires of a seller. Such a liberal returns policy would
be unlikely for "big-ticket" items that lose value as soon as they are reclassified as "used."
34. One obvious drawback of the deposit is that it subjects the buyer to the risk of loss in the
event that the seller fails to perform.
35. A penalty clause is not enforceable unless the courts deem it a liquidated damages
clause. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 565 (2d ed. 1977) (parties may
not provide for penalties in event of breach, but may determine in advance damages to be as-
sessed); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979) ("A term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty."); U.C.C. § 2-
718 comment 1 (1978) (same). Regardless of whether the parties call the nonrefundable deposit a
penalty or liquidated damages, the courts will not allow it if the stipulated amount is out of pro-
portion to the probable damage. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra, at 566.
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penalty clauses. The best policy would probably be to have no liability
for lost profits unless the agreement so provides. The provision would
probably take the form of a nonrefundable deposit, but there is no a
priori reason to restrict the parties' choice to this device.
The Neri contract did utilize a deposit, and its fate was interesting.
Neri's initial deposit was only $40, but when the dealer arranged for
"immediate delivery on the basis of 'a firm sale'" the deposit was in-
creased to $4250, even though the dealer's margin was only around
$2500.36 On the back of the contract, in small print, the following term
appeared: "If the within agreement is cancelled by mutual consent, the
seller shall retain the deposit paid hereunder, whether paid in cash or
other consideration, as liquidated damages. 37 In his complaint, the
plaintiff alleged: "The said provision of the contract appeared on the
reverse side in fine print and is fraud." 38 The trial court judge did not
agree, but did rule that "[t]he liquidated damage clause. . . does not
apply to the instant case since the contract was not cancelled by the
mutual consent of the parties. Accordingly an assessment of damages
must be had, at which time it may be determined whether the plaintiffs
are entitled to the return of any portion of the down payment previ-
ously made."39 This ruling was not appealed. Consequently, the mag-
nitude of the deposit was not a relevant factor in the determination of
damages.4" The court only allowed Marine to keep the $2579, expected
profit plus an additional $674 for incidental expenses of storage, up-
keep, finance charges, and insurance.
4 1
CONCLUSION
The lost profit question is not litigated often, as Goetz and Scott
note.42 The dearth of reported cases probably reflects the widespread
36. Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 396-97, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166-67, 285
N.E.2d 311, 312 (1972).
37. Record on Appeal at 79, Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165,
285 N.E.2d 311 (1972). I am grateful to plaintiff's counsel, George Razis, for providing me with
the Neri record.
38. Id at 13a.
39. Id at 9a.
40. It is surprising that the "mutual consent" language would be interpreted in this manner.
This finding is most likely another manifestation of the courts' hostility to penalties. See supra
note 35. Subsequent contracts were probably modified to allow liquidated damages in the absence
of mutual consent to cancellation.
41. Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 401,334 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171,285 N.E.2d 311,
315 (1972).
42. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 351 and n.65 (no retail lost-volume cases litigated
under U.C.C.; automobile dealers have not litigated lost volume claims for over 20 years).
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use of deposits for purchases of expensive items; for less expensive
items, the expense of litigation, the relatively small stakes, and the pos-
sible adverse effects on the retailer's goodwill all tend to discourage
legal action.
If a customer reneges on a contract for future delivery, the least
cost method of mitigating damages will be to purchase reselling serv-
ices at the fair market price. That price is, roughly, the retailer's gross
margin. An alternative way of making the same point is to view the
retailer as a fisherman and ask what he loses if someone liberates a fish
from his catch. The loss is the net revenue from that fish which is,
again, roughly the gross margin. The lost sale (or fish) does result in
damages of the sort described in U.C.C. section 2-708(2).
This, however, does not mean that the losses should be borne by
the breaching party. In the idealized world which serves as a straw
man for Coase and Demsetz, it makes no difference which party bears
ihe losses. The outcomes are identical. When one leaves that world, a
strong case could be made for holding customers not liable unless there
is explicit contract language to the contrary. Sellers would probably
find the nonrefundable deposit a low cost, effective tool for establishing
damages.
